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THE CONCEPT OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN THE
EARLY LEGAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
HOWARD R. BERmAN*
INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the concept of aboriginal rights has attracted little
notice in the international community. Aside from old treatises on
the law of nations, no coherent body of law or theory has emerged to
give shape to the conflict between indigenous peoples and the civilized
world. At the present time, indigenous peoples are entering various
legal systems, both national and international, to assert their claims
for a land base and sovereign independence. A substantial body of
analysis and documentation from the perspective of native peoples is
urgently required to authenticate these claims in these often alien
forums.
One of the more fertile areas for research is in the early legal
history of the United States. Buried in the treaties, statutes, reports,
and case law is a wealth of documentation that forms a potential basis
for the articulation and litigation of aboriginal rights. The court cases
are particularly valuable, in that they provide the earliest incorporation of aboriginal rights in the legal system of a nation-state.:' These
materials are difficult to work with, however, because they require
almost an archeology to restore the historical and cultural context that
is almost universally ignored in legal writing. Common law concepts
are easily disembodied and manipulated. The record of United States
Indian law is unusually complex because of the ad hoc self-serving
nature of many of the decisions.
Many of the early cases that established important precedents in
the development of Indian law were not litigated by the Indian nations. Often, the analyses and dicta concerning aboriginal rights were
tangential to the issues in controversy. Nevertheless, these cases form
the foundation of a legal system that presently engages Indian people
and their land rights, and have application to other indigenous peoples
throughout the world in their conflict with nation-states.
* Lecturer in American Indian Law, State University of New York at Buffalo,
Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence; B.A., University of Rochester 1967; M.A. History,
J.D., SUNY/Buffalo 1973; Member New York Bar.
1. The term nation-state is used to avoid later confusion. Many of the Supreme
Court cases analyzed in this study concern states of the United States.
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The purpose of this article is to trace the evolution of a doctrine
of aboriginal rights that was developed in the United States Supreme
Court during the tenure of John Marshall as Chief Justice. 2 The cases
under consideration often involve issues of national sovereignty. Since
a domestic judicial system is an arm of the sovereign, it is beyond the
power of a domestic court to render an independent judgment on the
scope of national sovereignty. Any judicial determination, therefore,
in favor of the concept of aboriginal rights in a domestic setting must
be given great weight.
I.

FLETCHER V. PECK

The question of aboriginal rights first reached the judicial forum
in 1810 with the case of Fletcherv. Peck.3 One of the central elements
of this case was whether the State of Georgia had the power to convey a
property interest in western lands that were in part held under "Indian
title." As in Johnson v. McIntosh,4 another of the early cases that
shaped the nature of aboriginal rights in United States law, the issues
were litigated by parties other than the Indian nations, and involved
controversies that were far removed from actual conflict between Indians and other sovereigns over jurisdiction of the soil.
In 1795, the Georgia Legislature conveyed the state's interest in
certain western lands in fee simple to the Georgia Company. Allegations of bribery and other corruption, however, resulted in the voiding
of the contract of sale by a subsequent legislature.5 In spite of this
action, the interest in the lands successively changed hands, culminating in a conveyance from Peck to Fletcher. This transaction and
the litigation that it produced were widely regarded as feigned" in
order to gain clarification of the validity of title through the judicial
process, a clarification that had been impossible to obtain through
the United States Congress. 7
The provisions of the contract of sale and the pleadings of the
parties in the case were carefully drawn to thoroughly litigate all
possible issues -that lent ambiguity to land titles under the original
2. Chief Justice Marshall served from 1801 to 1835.
3. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
4. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
5.

C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, at 310-11 (1944).
6. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147.
7. C. HAINES, supra note 5, at 314.
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Georgia conveyance. 8 In his deed to Fletcher, Peck covenanted that
" 'the state of Georgia aforesaid was, at the time of the passing of the
act of the legislature thereof . . . legally seised in fee of the soil
thereof, subject only to the extinguishment of part of the Indian title
thereon.' "' Both parties pleaded that the fee simple title to the lands
existed apart from and compatible with the Indian title, either in the
State of Georgia or in the United States. 10 Arguments for Peck, the
defendant, attempted to define the Indian title by the common law
rules of real property. In this view aboriginal tenures were not recognizable under the common law and had to be established by the law
of nations:
What is the Indian title? It is a mere occupancy for the purpose
of hunting. It is not like our tenures; they have no idea of a title to
the soil itself. It is overrun by them, rather than inhabited. It is not a
true and legal possession. Vattel, b. 1. § 81. p. 37 and § 209. b. 2.
§ 97. Montesquieu, b. 18. c. 12. Smith's Wealth of Nations, b. 5. c. 1.
It is a right not to be transferred but extinguished. It is a right regulated by treaties, not by deeds of conveyance. It depends upon the law
of nations, not upon municipal right."
The law of nations, as cited in the pleadings, expressed a cultural
definition of land tenure based on European institutions. The writings
of Vattel concerning land tenures, in particular, were consistent
with European designs of empire and 'the later notions of "manifest
destiny."'12 John Quincy Adams, one of the attorneys for Peck, had
been elaborating on these themes for some time. In an 1802 "Oration
on the Anniversary Festival of the Pilgrims," he discussed the scope
of the Indians' possessory rights:
The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to the
greatest part of the country, upon a questionable foundation. Their
cultivated fields, their constructed habitations, a space of ample
sufficiency for their subsistence, and whatever they had annexed to
themselves by personal labor, was undoubtably by the laws of nature
theirs. But what is the right of a huntsman[?] .. .Shall the lordly

savage not only disdain the virtues and enjoyments of civilization
himself, but shall he control the civilization of a world? Shall he forbid the wilderness to blossom like the rose? Shall he forbid the oaks
8. Id. at 314-15.
9. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 88.
10. Id. at 121.
11. Id.
12. See 3 E. DE VATTEL, THE
(1st ed. Neuchatel 1758).

LAW
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NATIONS

§§ 77-82 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916)
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of the forest to fall before the ax of industry and13rise again transformed into the habitations of ease and elegance?
Adams argued that the Indian title was not a "municipal right" that
could be recognized by the laws of the United States. His view was that
by virtue of 'the cultural superiority of European institutions, the law
of nations characterized the transfer of lands from aboriginal peoples
to the European settler colonies as a natural law transaction that
should not be impeded.
In the majority opinion written by John Marshall, the Court in
large part ignored the pleadings as to the nature of the Indian title.
Marshall, always sensitive to the political currents of his time, saw the
primary issue as a potential conflict between the United States and
Georgia over jurisdiction of the lands.' 4 The cession of western land
claims to the United States was a difficult political controversy for
many years until the Georgia claims were finally ceded in 1802.1 The
question of the right of the state to sell an interest in these lands was
resolved by the Court in favor of Georgia, but the precise nature of
the state's interest in the lands was difficult to conceptualize within
the legal framework established by the parties. The concept of fee
simple was urged to define a relationship to the land that was largely
inchoate and dependent on the extinguishing of the Indian title by
the federal government. To Marshall,
[s]ome difficulty was produced by the language of the covenant,
and of the pleadings. It was doubted whether a state can be seised in
fee of lands, subject to the Indian title, and whether a decision that
they were seised in fee, might not be construed to amount to a decision that their grantee might maintain an ejectment for them, not16
withstanding that title.
Under the Anglo-American common, law, the owner of a fee
simple interest could utilize legal procedures to gain actual possession.
13. [1867] REPORT OF SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, part 2, 40th Cong. 2d Sess.,
ANNUAL REPORT ON INDIAN AFFAIRS BY THE AcTING COMMISSIONER 144, quoted in

Royce, Indian Land Cessions in the United States, 18 BUREAU OF Am. ETHNOLOGY
ANN. REP. 527, 536 (1899).

14.

The question, whether the vacant lands within the United States became

a joint property, or belonged to the separate states, was a momentous question

which, at one time, threatened to shake the American confederacy to its
foundation. This important and dangerous contest has been compromised,

and the compromise is not now to be disturbed.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142.
15. R. BILLINGTON, WESTWARD ExPANSioN 206 (2d ed. 1960).
16. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142.
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This process would have subverted the established sovereign rights
of the United States to extinguish the Indian title. The Court surmounted this problem with the simple assertion that "the nature of
the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until
it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repug17
nant to seisin in fee on the part of the state."
Remarkably, in this one phrase, Marshall was able to recognize
the existence of the Indian tide, reaffirm the role of the United States
as the sovereign entity empowered to extinguish that title, and give
the paramount property right to the lands in question to the State
of Georgia. The Court thus validated the disputed covenant of the
land conveyance,' 8 but at the expense of any clear definition of the
nature of the Indian title or the meaning of "fee simple" in this context. Despite this imprecision, the use of the concept of fee simple
to express a right of preemption set forth an idiom of discourse that
would later serve, of itself, as a serious qualification of aboriginal
land rights.
Justice Johnson, in his dissent, argued powerfully against the
compatibility of fee simple ownership by the state with the Indian
title. In his view, the tribes of Georgia were "the absolute proprietor[s]
of their soil," a condition incident to their status as "independent
people" as expressed in "innumerable treaties formed with them."'19
Fee simple ownership was an exclusive concept, the substance of
which lay with the Indian nations. "In fact, if the Indian nations be
the absolute proprietors of their soil, no other nation can be said to
have the same interest in it." "What, then, practically," he asked, "is
the interest of the states in the soil of the Indians within their boundaries?" 20 The answer was a very clear articulation of aboriginal national rights and of the historical relationship of the European governments to the Indian nations:
Unaffected by particular treaties, [the interest of the states] is nothing
more than what was assumed at the first settlement of the country,
to wit, a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusively of all competitors within certain defined limits. All the restrictions upon the
right of soil in the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of all competitors from their markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty
17. Id. at 142-43.
18. See id. at 88.

19. Id. at 146-47 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 147.
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of governing every person within their limits
amounts to the right
21

except themselves.

Johnson perceived that "[i]t is awkward to apply the technical idea of
a fee-simple 'to -the interests of a nation. ' 22 National rights are not the
same thing as estates in lands but involve issues of sovereignty and
jurisdiction that are inseparably wedded to questions of land tenure.
He clearly recognized the full scope of aboriginal rights as established
and memorialized through the treaty making process between the
sovereigns of the settler colonies and the Indian nations.
It is apparent, however, that John Marshall and the majority
were unwilling to burden this opportunity to expand the national
legal system with questions of aboriginal rights. The primary focus of
the decision concerned the constitutional protection of the obligation
of contract and the right of the courts of the United States to overturn
unconstitutional acts of the state legislatures.P In fact, the Indian
question is rarely mentioned in the commentaries on this case. Chancellor Kent, in his comment on the majority statement on the Indian
without any distitle, called the statement "a mere naked declaration,
' 4
"2
it.
of
support
in
court
the
by
reasoning
or
cussion
Despite the semantic play and doctrinal ambiguity of Fletcher v.
Peck, it is an important case to the study of aboriginal rights. It provides a first statement in the evolution of a doctrine of aboriginal
rights in the Marshall Court. There is here a definite recognition of
something called the "Indian title." Marshall's concept that this title
is compatible with an interest in the same lands by another sovereign
would eventually be used to form a hierarchy of land rights. 25 Justice
Johnson's guileless definition of native land rights as an attribute
of the independence and sovereignty of the Indian nations would also
form part of the continuing debate within the Court as events required greater precision in the definitions of Indian rights.
II.

JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH

The Supreme Court was again given the opportunity to comment
on the nature of Indian rights in 1823 with the case of Johnson v.
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. C.

HAINES,

supra note 5, at 323-28.

ON AMERICAN LAW 379 n.(c)
York 1889) (1st ed. New York 1826).
25. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).

24. 3 J.

KENT, COMMENTARIES

(rev. cd. New
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McIntosh.26 Although the doctrines propounded in -the case were severly modified in later rulings of the Marshall Court, 7 Johnson v.
McIntosh has been selected as a significant precedent by courts in the
United States and other common law jurisdictions in decisions that have
substantially reduced the scope of, or denied entirely, aboriginal rights
to land.28 It is therefore important to examine this case closely, to critically analyze the reasoning of the Court, and to locate it historically
in the development of the judicial recognition of aboriginal rights.
The actual controversy concerned the recognition of title to vast
tracts -of land originally within the claimed limits of the Virginia Colony and later ceded to the United States as part of the Northwest Territories. In 1773 and 1775, a group of land speculators purchased lands
directly from the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations respectively. 29 The
lands in question were subsequently ceded by the Indian nations
through treaty to the United States who granted a title to a portion of
the lands to William McIntosh. In an action of ejectment against McIntosh, the devisees of a member of the original land company sought
to establish title to the lands. "The inquiry, therefore, is, in a great
measure, confined to the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the Courts of this
country."8 0
The simplicity of the issue thus stated, and the clarity of the factual situation, belies the far ranging and intricate analysis of land tenures that underlies the decision of the case. Marshall seized upon this
controversy to establish a judicial mythology that would rationalize
the origin of land tides in the United States. 3
26. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
27. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
28. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States. 348 U.S. 272 (1955), and Milirrpum
v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., [1971] 17 F.L.R. 141 (Aust. Sup. Ct. N. Terr.), are two important examples of the utilization of Johnson v. McIntosh concepts. See also Lester &
Parker, Land Rights: The Australian Aborigines Have Lost a Battle, But . . . , 11
ALBERTA L. REv. 189 (1973).
29. The claims of rival land speculation companies to western lands were a
serious issue in the Continental Congress. Maryland, in 1778, announced that it would
never ratify the Articles of Confederation until all western lands were ceded by the
states to the central government. See R. BILLINGTON, supra note 15, at 200-01.
30. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
31. An important dimension to Marshall's reasoning involved an Americanization
of the law of real property. In the early years of the Constitution there was an effort to
create a legal system independent of the restrictions of status relationships in European
feudalism. While a law of personal or movable property had emerged as an independent
body of law within Europe in response to the requirements of an expanding mercantile
class, the law of real property was securely grounded in feudal tenures. By qualifying
the issues raised in cases concerning land acquisition from Indian nations in real property
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If this project were the sole legacy of the case, Johnson v. McIntosh
would be of only minor interest to the study of aboriginal rights;
however, the reasoning of the case created a theory of conquest that
stands as a centerpiece for the judicial diminution of native rights. It
is curious that a theory of conquest should derive from a dispute in
which one party claimed 'title to lands under a right of purchase from
the Indians and the other party under a grant resulting from a formal
treaty between the United States and the Indian nations.
The ultimate decision of the case was in fact based on the primacy
of a federal treaty with an Indian nation. Although obscured by the
ponderous dicta of the opinion, Johnson stands for the principle that
the extinguishment of the Indian title in North America was the sole
prerogative of the appropriate Euro-American sovereign through either
a purchase or conquest, and that -the sole means by which jurisdiction
over Indian lands could 'be legally transferred was through a formal
acquisition by the United States directly from an Indian nation.
Marshall began his analysis of the power of the Indian nations to
grant title to lands within the United States with the observation that
"the right of society to prescribe those rules by which property may be
acquired and preserved is not, and cannot, be drawn into question."
The Court therefore based its conclusions not only on -the "principles
of abstract justice" reflected in the law of nations, but also on principles "which our own government has adopted in the particular case,
32
and given us as the rule for our decision."
Title to lands in North America was rooted in the European discovery. This "doctrine of discovery" provided an organizing principle
terms, Marshall was able to create a law of real property that arose directly from
territorial claims within the United States, which could be interpreted according to
principles derived from the "natural law" philosophy of John Locke. The entire section
on real property in Kent's Commentaries, an early treatise on American jurisprudence,
is devoted to an analysis of Marshall Court cases involving the acquisition of Native
American lands. See 3 J. KENT, supra note 24, at 377.

Marshall's formulation of Indian land tenure in terms of "occupancy" rights was
conceptually identical to Locke's description of land holding in the state of nature as a
"tenancy in common." The implication of Locke's phrase is that the actual property
right is inchoate and only arises at the point at which individual possession with a
right of exclusion is acknowledged. The reality of a nation or community inhabiting
territory cooperatively, with land usage rooted in principles other than exclusivity, was
apparently beyond the scope of 17th century English thought. The result is an AngloAmerican legal system with an inherent cultural bias that attributes an anomalous and
inferior status to non-European forms of land tenure. See J. LocKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16-30 (T. Peardon ed. 1952) (1st ed. 1690).
32. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
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through which the European nations articulated claims against each
other to spheres of control within the western hemisphere.
This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by
whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the
natives, and establishing settlements upon it.33

The nature of the titles thus established included the right of European nations to grant the soil.
While the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the
natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in
themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession
of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey
34
a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.
At this stage of the Court's reasoning, the doctrine of discovery
amounted to no more than a distributional principle that created a
potential interest in the lands. This interest has been termed a "perfectable entitlement" 35 that could be made complete only by extinguishing the Indian title through a purchase or conquest. 36 As a regulating principle for the conduct of European nations, the doctrine recognized the Indian title and provided a mechanism by which that title
might be acquired by the Europeans.
This principle was adequate to establish a framework for the orderly derivation of land titles in the United States. The right of exclusion against European nations could be readily traced through a
chain of sovereign succession beginning with the British Grown and
culminating with the formation of the United States.37 The exclusive
right to extinguish the Indian title, combined with the now judiciallyrecognized sovereign power to establish land titles coterminous with
the Indian title, set forth sufficient grounds to determine the validity
of land holdings within the United States.
33. Id. at 573.
34. Id. at 574.
35. Henderson, Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 Air.

90-91 (1977).
36. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
37. Id. at 574-87.

INDN

L.J. 75,
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Marshall was not content to rest the Court's decision solely on
these grounds. He proceeded to explore the nature of the relationship that discovery created between the Indian nations and the United
States. It is here that "principles of abstract justice" are left behind.
As a juridical principle derived from the conduct of nations, discovery concerned only the European nations. The occurrence of discovery, however, created a continuing relationship with the indigenous
peoples of the continent, the legal consequences of which remained to
be mapped.
Discovery, then, must be viewed in its dual aspects; first as a rule
of exclusivity to determine which European nation was entitled to
acquire the Indian title through a purchase or conquest, and second
as an event that established a relationship between the European nations and the Indian nations. Surprisingly, it is under the first aspect
of discovery that the only concrete expression of a limitation on Indian sovereignty occurs in this case. Under the rule of exclusivity,
"their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that
''a Thus the
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it."
Indian sovereignty, which was complete before the European discovery,
was qualified in this case only by the limitation on the scope of alienability.
It is strange that Marshall should analyze the Indian-European
relationship under the rights adhering to discovery. An extensive literature on the law of nations existed concerning the rights of nonEuropean peoples.3 9 It cannot be assumed that Marshall was ignorant
of .the law of nations as it had been conceived up to his time. The
writings of such classical publicists as Vattel, Grotius, Puffendorf, and
others were introduced in the pleadings of Fletcherv. Peck and Johnson v. McIntosh to argue the validity of Indian sovereignty. 40 Moreover, these writings were well known to legal scholars of his day. It
is clear that this omission was by deliberate choice and reflected his
intention to base his analysis on other grounds.
At the outset, Marshall announced his intention to ratify a specific historical process that resulted in the transfer of vast areas of land
38. Id. at 574.
39. M. LINDLnY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-23 (1926).
40. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 563, 567-68; Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 121.
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to the jurisdiction of the United States. 41 He ruled that "[t]hose relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were
to be regulated by themselves." 42 The actual historical record of the
relationship as memorialized in the treaty process provided ample opportunity to derive legal principles. Moreover, the Chief Justice revealed more than a passing familiarity with the historical antecedents
of the controversies before the Court in the texts of his decisions. He
chose, however, also to omit the treaty process from his analysis. Instead he presented what might be termed a political standard based
on the creation of a myth of conquest 43 that was rooted in the judicial power to define, rather than in historical reality. It is on this point
that the opinion becomes confusing and occasionally incoherent.
In the middle of the opinion Marshall restated the doctrine of
discovery, but with an important addition. He stated that "discovery
gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy,
either by purchase or conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree
of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow them
to exercise. ' 44 While this assertion of sovereignty is given without explanation and is otherwise left undefined, it hints at a political standard that would make Indian lands vulnerable to forced extinguishment. The restatement is followed in the text by a disclaimer that
the issues were not being decided according to theories of cultural
superiority, but that the Court was bound to ratify the end results of
the political process whatever its ideological roots.
We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists,
merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to
expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their
limits. Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals
original justice of the claim which has been
may be, respecting the
45
successfully asserted.

The Court here introduced the language of conquest for the first time,
combined with perhaps the earliest articulation of the "political question" doctrine as applied to the issue of aboriginal rights. There is no
immediate hint in the text as to the source of the conquest theory.
41.

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.

42. Id. at 573.
43. For a contrary view denying the existence of a theory of conquest in Johnson,
see Henderson, supra note 35, at 92.
44. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
45. Id. at 588.
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The description of British claims to a right of extinguishment that
"have been maintained and established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword ' 46 quite apparently refers to the war with the
French,47 and does not provide a basis for a theory of conquest of
the Indian nations.
It is only later in the opinion that the source of the conquest
theory is revealed to lie in the mere act of discovery:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery
of an inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the principle
has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a
country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of
the land, and cannot be questioned.48
The equation of discovery to conquest amounts to a nimble transmutation of definition that itself stands as a conquest by judicial fiat. The
historical record is quite clear that most of the lands alienated to the
United States were acquired by purchase rather than by warfare. 4
Marshall provided no historical context for the derivation of the conquest theory. 50 He simply characterized the status quo, without analy46. Id.
47. Henderson, supra note 35, at 92.
48. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
49. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34-35, 45-46 (1947).
50. The conquest theory was not even credible in a political context. At a Council
in 1793 with the confederated tribes of the Northwest Territory at war with the United
States, the United States Commissioners, appointed by the President to negotiate a
treaty of peace, unequivocally repudiated the theory of conquest and the notion that
Great Britain enjoyed a right of sovereignty over the Indian nations and their territories
that passed to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. The Commissioners were instructed to "carefully guard the rights of pre-emption of the United States to the Indian

country...

."

1 AMERICAN

STATE PAPERS, INDIAN AFFAIRS 341.

Brothers: The Commissioners of the United States have formerly set up
a claim to your whole country, southward of the great lakes, as the property
of the United States, grounding this claim on the treaty of peace with your
father, the King of Great Britain, who declared, as we have before mentioned,
the middle of these lakes, and the waters which unite them, to be the
boundaries of the United States.
Brothers: We are determined that our whole conduct should be marked
with openness and sincerity. We, therefore, frankly tell you, that we think
that the Commissioners put an erroneous construction on that part of our
treaty with the King. As he had not purchased the country of you, of course
he could not give it away; he only relinquished to the United States his claim
to it. That claim was founded on right acquired by treaty, with other white
nations, to exclude them from purchasing, or settling, in any part of your
country; and it is this right which the King granted to the United States.
Id. at 353. In reply, the Confederated Council denied even this right of pre-emption:
Brothers: You have talked, also, a great deal about pre-emption, and
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sis, as resulting from a conquest incident to discovery; a characterization rooted solely in the pretentious rhetoric of European notions of
empire.
Despite the rhetoric of conquest, the consequences flowing to the
status of Indian lands from this theory were nonexistent. Virtually
every expression of "conquest," "sovereignty," or "ultimate dominion," is followed in the opinion by either a declaration of the exclusive right of 'the United States to extinguish the Indian title, or a
repetition of the limitation of the right of alienation of Indian lands.
The theory of conquest under discovery then, created no greater rights
than the doctrine of discovery as it was initially articulated. Although
the use of terms such as "absolute title" to describe the rights of the
United States, and "occupancy" to describe the rights of 'the Indian
nations 5' seems to indicate a hierarchy of land tenures, a careful reading of the text reveals that these characterizations of property interests
did nothing to affect the essential relationships described by Marshall
in this case. Whether the Indian interest was termed "title" or "occupancy," it stood as a legal right that was only qualified by a limitation over which European nations might acquire the interest. The
natives "were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with
a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it
according to their own discretion," and their rights to complete sovereignty were only diminished by the distributional preference of the
discovery principle.52 The European right, whatever its label, remained
a right to extinguish the Indian title by established procedures of
your exclusive right to purchase Indian lands, as ceded to you by the King, at

the treaty of peace.
Brothers: We never made any agreement with the King, nor with any
other nation, that we would give to either the exclusive right of purchasing
our lands; and we declare to you, that we consider ourselves free to make any
bargain or cession of lands, whenever and to whomever we please. If the
white people, as you say, made a treaty that none of them but the King
should purchase of us, and that he has given that right to the United States,
it is an affair which concerns you and him, and not us; we have never parted
with such a power.
Id. at 356.
51.
An absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in different persons,
or in different governments. An absolute, must be an exclusive title, or at least
a title which excludes all others not compatible with it. All our institutions
recognise the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy, and recognise the absolute title of the crown to extinguish that
right. This is incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the Indians.
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.
52. Id. at 574.
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purchase or conquest. It is unfortunate that the rhetoric of the opinion, as dicta, has often obscured these basic principles.
The parallel interests in land identified but left undefined in
Fletcher v. Peck5 3 are given no greater clarity under either the doctrine of discovery or its derivative theory of conquest. The dicta of
conquest, however, do provide some concepts of interest to the study
of aboriginal rights. As Marshall pointed out, the people of a conquered land are usually "incorporated with the victorious nation and
become subjects or citizens of the government with which they are
connected." When this occurs, "the rights of the conquered to property
should remain unimpaired." 54 This right to property is a well settled
principle under the law of sovereign succession. 5 The political independence and military power of the Indian nations, however, rendered
it impossible to either assimilate them into the settler colonies or to
govern them "as a distinct society."5 6
As a result, expressions of European dominion and sovereignty
under the doctrine of discovery extend only to an interest in land. In
English feudal theory, the dominion of the King includes both the
right of government and the right of property.5 7 In this case, the concept of sovereignty is fragmented in a novel fashion to conform to the
political reality of the Indian nations. Although discovery initiated a
continuing limited legal relationship to the lands of North America,
it did not extend any legal status to the Indians as political communities. With the single exception of the right of alienability of land,
the original, indeed aboriginal, sovereignty of the Indian nations is
unimpaired by, and not included in, the concept of discovery.
Justice Marshall apparently viewed the conquest as foreclosing a
judicial review of -the discovery relationships articulated in this case. 8
There is evidence throughout the opinion that he regarded discovery
rights as a political principle originating in the royal patents of the
British Crown; 59 these royal documents, with 'their rhetoric of empire,
53. See 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142-43.
54. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.
55. P. CUMMINGS & N. MIKLENBERO, NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA 18 n.31 (2d

ed. 1972).
56. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
57. "The word dominium . . . came into the law with the Normans and is one
of those protean terms of eleventh-century feudalism. It is definitive not merely of
proprietory or possessory rights in land but also of the governmental and contractual
incidents of tenure." Goebel, Introduction to J. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL
FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS at xxi-xxii (1950).
58. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.
59. Id. at 576-80.
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are the only concrete historical sources given by the Court in support
of the decision. Under Marshall's limitation of the scope of judicial
review, the Court could only ratify the political process of land acquisition and the various theories of entitlement that were used historically to justify the taking. He recognized that even the restrictions
on the right of free alienability of the Indian nations were contrary
to the law of nations, 60 but perhaps equally recognized -that "manifest
destiny" was not a justiciable issue.
The source of much of the confusion in Johnson is the attempt
to extend the discovery principle into the political realm. M. F. Lindley, an authority on the international law of aboriginal peoples, has
succinctly summed up this problem:
What the discoverer's State obtained, as against other European
Powers, was the right to acquire the lands discovered-what in later
times might have been called a "sphere of influence"-and questions
dealing with the mode of acquisition had no place in a statement of
the grounds upon which one European Power based its claims as
against the others. 61
The conquest theory of the Chief Justice was a heavy burden to

lay on the fragile concept of discovery rights. At the time that the doctrine of discovery was elevated by the Court to a central place in the
determination of the United States dominion over Indian lands, it was
regarded as increasingly archaic in the relations of states. In 1790, in
a dispute known as the Nootka Sound Controversy,6 2 England and

Spain agreed to the principle that areas of Northwest North America
not actually occupied were open to free access by the traders of both
states. In the dispute over the Oregon Territory between the United
States and Great Britain, both sides agreed by 1826 that mere discovery could not grant a complete title.63
60.
So, too, with respect to the concomitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed,
while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of
transferring the absolute title to others. However this restriction may be opposed
to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable
to that system under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the
actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and

certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice.
Id. at 591-92.
61. M. LINDLEY, supra note 39, at 29.
62. Sinsarian, The Acquisition of Legal Title to Terra Nullius, 53 POL. SCt. Q.
111, 123 (1938).
63. The British Commissioners argued:
Upon the question of how far prior discovery constitutes a legal claim to sov-
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By the early 19th century, therefore, discovery alone was no
longer valid as a distributional principle. Indeed, it is questionable if
it ever was totally accepted as a sufficient basis for dominion. As a
distributional principle it was given limited recognition and various
definitions by the European states. The early publicists of the law of
nations were in basic agreement that title was dependent on actual possession in addition to discovery." It is not surprising then that John
Marshall avoided a discussion of the law of nations in Johnson. The
English charters g-ranting the lands of North America "into the land
throughout from sea to sea," 5 were given at a time when only a few
small settlements existed on the Atlantic coast. 06
Even England, characterized by Marshall as an unequivocal supporter of the discovery principle,67 departed from the principle when
it suited its national purpose. In response to Spanish claims to the New
World based on the Papal Donation resulting from the Spanish discovery, Queen Elizabeth announced that
[t]his donation of what does not belong to the donor and this imaginary right of property ought not to prevent other princes from carrying on commerce in those regions or establishing colonies there in
places not inhabited by the Spaniards. Such action would in no way
violate the law of nations, since prescription without possession is
6s
not valid.

Often the taking of possession was merely symbolic. Francis Drake
took symbolic possession of the Straits of Magellen "with Turfe and
Twigge, after the English manner." 69 While these acts were viewed as
establishing title to uninhabited lands or terra nullius,7° under the
law of nations they could not create a title to inhabited lands, the
ereignty, the law of nations is somewhat vague and undefined. It is, however,
admitted by the most approved writers that mere accidental discovery, unattended by exploration-by formally taking possession in the name of the
discoverers sovereign-by occupation and settlement, more or less permanentby purchase of the territory, or receiving sovereignty from the natives-constitutes the lowest degree of title.
M. LINDLEY, supranote 39, at 134.
64. Id. at 131.
65. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 578.
66. M. LINDLEY, supra note 39, at 130.
67. "No one of the powers of Europe gave its full assent to this principle more
unequivocally than England." 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 576.
68. Cheyney, International Law Under Queen Elizabeth, 20 ENG. HIST. REV. 660
(1905) (emphasis added).
69. A. KELLER, 0. LISsITZYN & F. MANN, CREATION OF RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY
THROUGH SYMBOLIC ACTS 1400-1800, at 57 (1938).
70. Id, at 3-5. This study was based on the premise that the lands of the western
hemisphere were terra nullius, that is, legally uninhabited. It relies almost exclu-
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natives of which were generally regarded as possessing some form of
71
sovereignty.
The Dutch bolstered their claims to New Netherlands with formal agreements of purchase from the Indian nations. They argued
against the Spanish and the English that the Indian nations were -the
owners of the land, and that title must be acquired by a purchase or
grant from the natives. 72 The Dutch also followed this practice in their
colony on the Cape of South Africa, but not in South America. Sweden
adopted the purchase theory and recognized Dutch territorial claims
based on Indian deeds. 73 In reaction to Dutch expansion into the region of Connecticut, the English colonies of New England hurried to
sign their own agreements with the Indians. 74 In sum, although usually invoking the discovery principle, the European states based their
claims against each other on whatever theory was most appropriate to
their interests. Discovery, even combined with symbolic possession,
could be nothing more than a reservation of rights to effect future
attempts at actual possession.
Having established the principle that extinguishing the Indian
title to lands was the exclusive right of the sovereign, questions still
remained concerning the proper means by which this event was to
occur, and the status of land transactions between individual citizens
of the United States and an Indian nation. Marshall framed the issue
in terms of the power of "private individuals to receive, a title, which
can be sustained in the Courts of -this country. '75 One of the more
fundamental principles of the common law is that all titles to land
derive from the sovereign. In Johnson, lands were purchased directly
from the Indian nations. The Court was confronted with a situation
in which it was asked to locate within the legal system a recognition
of title to land that originated outside of the legal system in a private
transaction with another sovereign. In its analysis, the Supreme Court
recognized the validity of aboriginal title and of the complete prerogative of the Indian nations to determine their own tenures:
Admitting their power to change their laws or usages, so far as to
allow an individual to separate a portion of their lands from the
sively on the rhetoric of empire of the European states. It is this author's opinion
that this study is erroneous in total, and conforms neither to the writings of the contemporary publicists of the law of nations nor to the actual practice of nations.
71. M. LINDLEY, supra note 39, at 12-17.
72. W. MACLEOD, THE AMERICAN INDIAN FRONTIER 195 (1928).
73. Id. at 196.
74. F. JENNINGS, THE INVASION or AMERICA 172-74 (1975).
75. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
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common stock, and hold it in severalty, still it is a part of their
territory, and is held under them, by a title dependent on their laws.
The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and, if they choose to
resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, the Courts of
the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The
person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their territory,
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their
laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can
revise and set aside the proceeding. 76
Thus the case provides a common law precedent for the recognition of aboriginal usage based on aboriginal possession. The rights adhering 'to the Indian title, as presented above, derive from a distinct
tenurial system outside of the federal law77 and based on Indian sovereignty. This recognition is in conformity with the statement of the
Court at the beginning of 'the opinion that "the right of society to prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and preserved
... cannot be drawn into question"78 and with the description of the
right of occupancy as "a legal as well as just claim to retain possession
70
of [land] and to use it according to their own discretion."
The disclaimer of jurisdiction by the Court was a clear acknowledgment that
the sovereign authority of the United States did not extend to the Indian territories.
The sovereign right of the United States to extinguish Indian title
was symbolic of its sovereignty over individual citizens and the constituent states. The actual transfer of the jurisdiction over lands is a
mutual act of ultimate sovereigns. Marshall's presentation of the status
of an individual purchase of lands from an Indian nation was not different from the status of land purchased by an American citizen in,
for example, Canada.
In Johnson, the Indian nations ceded the lands in question to the
United States without a reservation of the title of 'the land companies
in the treaty.80 This was a transaction between two sovereigns. The
Court ruled that the Indian nations had "an unquestioned right to annul any grant 'they had made to American citizens" 81 and that the land
companies could not set up their title against the United States.
76. Id. at 593.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Land tenure theory is discussed in Henderson, supra note 35, at 93-96.
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
Id. at 594.
Id.
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Johnson v. McIntosh is perhaps one of the most misunderstood
cases in the Anglo-American law. A great deal of the confusion that
this case has inspired is due to -the Court's difficulty in finding a language to adequately express, in legal concepts, the politically sensitive
relationship of the Indian nations with the United States. A careful
reading of the case, however, will reveal certain principles that are
important to the study of aboriginal rights.
The doctrine of discovery is a distributional principle by which
the European nations determined which of them possessed the exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title by purchase or conquest. It
was a theory for the acquisition of property only and it was applied
to the external relations of the Europeans with the Indian nations.
The doctrine affected the complete, original sovereignty of the Indian
nations only insofar as it limited the scope of the alienability of land
to Europeans. There is nothing either explicit or implicit in the doctrine that could create a trust relationship over Indian lands.
The Indian right of occupancy is a legal right based on aboriginal possession that carries with it complete discretion for 'tribal tenures
in Indian territory. These tenures certainly included traditional and
communal usage.
Fee simple is an ambiguous concept in this case. The interpretation that the European discovery of the continent instantly brought
into being a fee simple property right in the common law sense to all
the lands in the western hemisphere was justly ridiculed in Worcester
v. Georgia.s It is clear that these words had a special meaning in the
context of Indian law. The concept stands for what was also termed
a "right of preemption," that is to say, an exclusive right to acquire
against other European nations and nothing more. Later courts, with
a superficial recitation of the familiar words "fee simple," interpreted
Johnson as standing for the principle that the United States possesses
a paramount property right over Indian lands, and that Indian occupancy is at sufferance. This notion is not supported by the text and
was explicitly contradicted in Worcester.
The theory of conquest is a legal fiction that had no immediate
consequences. It was not based on any historical reality other than the
wording of Royal Charters granting feudal rights to North America.
It did, however, establish a language of juridical discourse that would
potentially rationalize the process of "manifest destiny" and provide
82. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

the conceptual space for the forced extinguishment of Indian lands.
The concept of conquest created in this case was repudiated by the
Court only nine years later in Worcester.
It should be noted that the judgment in Johnson had no immediate impact on the sovereign rights of any Indian nation. The lands
in question had been alienated decades prior to the litigation, first by
purchase, and eventually by treaty. John Marshall was formulating
principles in an abstract environment, principles that would acquire
clarity only in the later cases that actually involved Indian issues. The
legal concepts first articulated in Johnson v. McIntosh should be
viewed as part of an evolving doctrine of aboriginal rights in the Marshall Court.
III. TiH

CHEROKEE CASES

The Cherokee casess presented the Supreme Court with an actual
controversy over the scope of Indian rights to territorial integrity and
national sovereignty. The conflict arose from rival claims between the
State of Georgia and the Cherokee Nation over lands guaranteed to
the Cherokee by a treaty with the United States. In the Treaty of
Holston in 1791, the Cherokee Nation ceded certain lands to the
United States which in turn "solemnly guarantee[d] to the Cherokee
Nation, all their lands not hereby ceded."8 4 Under the treaty, some
five million acres remained to the Cherokee within the borders of the
State of Georgia.8 5
In 1802, Georgia ceded all of its claims to western lands in what
is now Arkansas and Mississippi to the United States on the express
condition that the United States would extinguish the Indian title to
the lands within the borders of the state "as soon as it could be done
peaceably and on reasonable terms."8' 6 As decades passed without much
of the Cherokee title being extinguished, Georgia began to press the
federal government to implement a policy of removing the Indians
from the state. The state regarded the Cherokee as tenants at will with
only a temporary right to use the lands.87
By the 1820's, the Cherokee had adopted many of the cultural
83. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.

Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
84. Treaty with the Cherokees, 7 Stat. 40 (1791).
85. 1 C. WARREN, TE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 729 (1926).
86. Id. See F. PRUcHA, AMER.ICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS
227-28 (1962).
87. F. PRUCHA, supra note 86, at 228.
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patterns of their white neighbors, including European forms of agriculture, and were reluctant to cede any of the remaining lands.88 In
1827, the Cherokee Nation adopted a written constitution "which asserted that the Cherokee were one of the sovereign and independent
nations of the earth with complete jurisdiction over their own territory."8' 9 Georgia responded by enacting a series of laws in 1828 and
1829 that extended -the laws of the state to the Indian lands, and established new counties to administer the acquisition.9" These laws
were clearly in conflict with the treaty of 1791.
The Cherokee Nation brought suit in the United States Supreme
Court seeking to enjoin the State of Georgia from enforcing these
laws. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia9' was commenced in the midst of
considerable political turmoil in the United States involving sectional
92
rivalries and state claims to a right of nullification over federal laws.
In Georgia v. Tassel, Georgia had already defied a writ of error from
the United States Supreme Court and executed a Cherokee man convicted of a murder committed in the Indian territory. 93 Georgia also
refused to send a representative -to litigate the Cherokee Nation case.94
The substantive issue in Cherokee Nation concerned the national
status of the Cherokee Nation. The case was decided on jurisdictional
grounds that nevertheless touched on the national question in a very
definite way. Article III of the Constitution defined the scope of
the judicial power to include controversies "'between a state ...

and

foreign states.' "- The jurisdictional issue, therefore, was whether the
Cherokee Nation constituted a foreign state "in the sense in which
that -term is used in the Constitution."9 The Court majority, speaking through John Marshall, acknowledged that the Cherokee were a
state possessing political independence and full powers of self gov9
ernment: r
They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement
of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United
States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations
88. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21
L. Rv.500, 503 (1969).
89. F. PRUCHA, supranote 86, at 231.
90. Burke, supra note 88, at 531.
91. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
92. C. WARREN, supra note 84, at 743.
93. Burke, sup ra note 88, at 512.

94. Id. at 513.
95. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
96. Id. at 16.

97. Id.

STAN.
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of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for
any violation of their engagements .... The acts of our government
plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are
bound by those acts. 98
The difficulty, however, was over the term "foreign."
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy,
until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our
government; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can,
with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may,
more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of possession, when their
right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian. 99
Although this language has been viewed as establishing a wardship or trust relationship between the Indian nations and the United

States government, it is more likely an attempt at a semantic resolution of a difficult conceptual problem. If the Indian nations are states,
but not foreign states, how could their actual character be described?
Most of the statement quoted above is simply a repetition of the doctrine of discovery.' 00 In any event, this language is merely dicta, as
the issue was decided on geography rather than wardship: "the constitution in this article does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term 'foreign nations;' not we presume because a tribe may not
be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States."'' 1
By this reasoning, the Court was able to refuse jurisdiction in
the case, thereby avoiding the political consequences of a decision,
while at the same time affirming the national character of the Indian
nations. This result was unsatisfactory to four of the justices of the
Court who felt that the case should have been decided on other
grounds. Justices Johnson and Baldwin agreed with Marshall that the
Cherokee had no standing before the Court, but based that opinion
on the idea that the Cherokee did not constitute a state. Baldwin, in
particular, interpreted the history of Indian-white relations as proving that the Indian tribes were not nations.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 17.
100. Henderson, supra note 35, at 102.
101. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19.
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In his concurring opinion, Baldwin quoted extensively from the
Court's decision in Johnson to support the principle that -the Indians
had no national rights. Specifically, he identified the use of the phrase
"ultimate dominion" as indicating a complete sovereignty in the British Crown, subject only to the natives' right of occupancy. He viewed
Johnson as
clearly establishing that from the time of discovery under the
royal government, the colonies, the states, the confederacy and this
Union, [the Indians'] tenure was the same occupancy, their rights
occupancy and nothing more; that the ultimate absolute fee, jurisdiction and sovereignty was in the government, subject only to such
rights; that grants vested soil and dominion, and the powers of
government, whether the land granted was vacant or occupied by
102
Indians.
Justice Thompson, in his dissent, recognized the Cherokee to be
a foreign nation and urged a remedy against the State of Georgia.
Strangely, this opinion was written at the request of Marshall'1 3 to
answer the arguments of Baldwin and Johnson. Thompson, joined by
Story, agreed with the majority that the Cherokee were a sovereign
state'0 4 with an unquestionable right to their lands. His interpretation of the right of occupancy was the polar opposite of Baldwin's:
And notwithstanding we do not recognize the right of the Indians
to transfer the absolute title of their lands to any other than ourselves; the right of occupancy is still admitted to remain in them,
accompanied with the right of self government, according to their
own usages and customs; and with the competency to act in a national
capacity, although placed under the protection of the whites ....
But the principle is universally admitted, that this occupancy belongs
to them as a matter of right, and not by mere indulgence....
In this view of their situation, there is as full and complete
recognition of their sovereignty, as if they were .
of the soil.' 05

.

. absolute owners

It is obvious that the ambiguity of the Court's reasoning in Johnson on the nature of aboriginal rights was fundamental and extreme.
Although Marshall was obviously sympathetic to the national rights
of the Cherokee, the Court's refusal to accept jurisdiction in the
Cherokee Nation case did nothing to resolve the wide disparity in
102. Id. at 48.
103. Burke, supra note 88, at 516.
104. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 37-39, 46.

105. Id. at 55.
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the interpretation of aboriginal rights set forth in the concurring and
dissenting opinions. What the Chief Justice did accomplish was the
avoidance of involving the Court too deeply in an explosive political
situation.
These issues, however, refused to disappear. Georgia continued
to enforce its laws in the Indian country. One of these laws required
all white persons residing in the Cherokee country after March 11,
1831, to obtain a license from the state.106 Two missionaries, Samuel
A. Worcester and Elizer Butler, refused to obtain this license and
also refused to leave the country when ordered to do so by the state.
They were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to four years imprisonment at hard labor. On an appeal to the Supreme Court, Worcester
based his argument on the sovereign rights of the Cherokee Nation.
Georgia once again declined to appear. 10 7 Thus in 1832, only one year
after the Court had successfully sidestepped this controversy, it was
compelled to face directly the issues raised by the Georgia-Cherokee
dispute.
Worcester v. Georgia0 8 provides the clearest, most complete articulation of the concept of aboriginal rights to be found in the American legal system. The ambiguities created by the -previous tentative
attempts by the Court to formulate principles for the adjudication of
disputes involving issues of aboriginal rights were directly addressed
and resolved. Worcester is the only case decided on the substantive
merits by the Marshall Court that actually involved a live issue of Indian rights. It may be viewed as the culmination of an evolving doctrine of aboriginal rights first addressed by the Court in Fletcher v.
Peck.
Worcester stands for the principle of complete sovereign rights
of the Cherokee Nation, and for the categorical repudiation of the
notion of conquest advanced in Johnson. Marshall began his opinion
with a discussion of the rights adhering to discovery:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inabited
by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of
each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their
own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is difficult to
comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of
the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the
106. 0. WARREN, supra note 85, at 753.
107. Burke, supra note 88, at 521.
108. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in
the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its
ancient possessors. 10 9
This language describes the sovereign condition of the Indian nations
prior to the European discovery. Discovery, as an exclusive principle,
regulated the conduct of the European nations,
but could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either
as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made
before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to purchase,
but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor
to sell. 110
This reasoning left no room for the idea that the act of discovery
established rights in the European nations that could be set against
the rights of the indigenous peoples of North America. The confusing equation of discovery with conquest advanced in Johnson is untenable when read in the light of these principles. Marshall not only
repudiated the theory of conquest, but he undercut the entire historical foundation for the theory described in that case. In Johnson, the
sole historical reference for the concept of conquest was to the Royal
Charters granting the rights of soil and government to the settler
colonies."'
In a careful re-examination of these Colonial Charters, Marshall
could find no basis for the granting of rights of sovereignty over the
Indian nations. He noted that although these documents purported to
convey the soil from sea to sea, the lands were actually occupied
by numerous and warlike nations, equally willing and able to defend
their possessions. The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble
settlements made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they
were made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people,
the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any
or occupy
2
11

man.

These documents could only convey whatever title was possessed by
the Crown and this amounted to nothing more than an exclusive right
of purchase. "The crown could not be understood to grant what the
crown did not affect to claim; nor was it so understood." ' s
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 544.
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544-45.
Id. at 545.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

The charters, as specific delegations of royal authority, did not
empower the colonies to engage in wars of conquest. The power to
make war was included in the grants "but defensive war alone seems to
have been contemplated." 1 4 The right to invade the natives and other
enemies was dependent on "just cause."' 115 The Court viewed these warnaking provisions as evidence that the natives were not the subjects
of the English, but were rather independent entities and potential enemies. Royal Charters "asserted a title against Europeans only, and were
considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were concerned." 116
The Court could find no evidence in the history of the British
relations with the Indian nations of an interference in the right of the
Indians to self-government. The interest of the Crown was to keep out
agents of foreign powers and to purchase lands when the Indians were
willing to sell. 1 7 Moreover, the Proclamation of 1763 set a boundary
between the English colonies and the Indian country and forbid purchase or settlement west of the line."a8
The United States in its formative years was eager to make agreements -of peace and alliance with the Indian nations. A number of
treaties were signed with the western tribes. The language 'of many of
these treaties included statements that placed the Indian nation under
the protection of the United States. Justice Baldwin, concurring in
Cherokee Nation, based his arguments against the national sovereignty
of the Cherokee in large part on the language of these treaties. One of
the more ambiguous statements in the majority opinion of that case
concerned -the language of dependence. 19 In its analysis of the history
of Indian relations, the Court proceeded to clarify the meaning of this
concept and to provide a framework by which these treaties were to be
construed.
The colonial authorities were a source of trade goods for the Indians and restrained their own citizens from encroaching on Indian
lands.
The Indians perceived in this protection only what was beneficial
to themselves .... It involved, practically, no claim to their lands,
114. Id.
115. Id.
116.
117.
subsidies;
118.
119.

Id. at 546.
Id. at 547. "[The King] also purchased their alliance and dependence by
but never intruded into the interior of their affairs ....
" Id.
Id. at 548.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 37-39, 46.
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no dominion over their persons. It merely bound the nation to the
British crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend and neighbor, and receiving the advantages of that protection, without involving a surrender of their national character. 120
Marshall stated that these relationships must be viewed through the
-understanding of the natives rather than the formal, and often self12 1
serving language of diplomatic documents.
Marshall's construction of the Treaty of Holston provides a detailed model for the interpretation of Indian treaties with the United
States. 122 In the peace treaty with Great Britain, the King could only
cede to the American Government what belonged to the Crown. These
cessions did not include a right of sovereignty over the Indian nations.
When the Indian nations -that were formerly under the protection of
the British Crown agreed to the protection of the United States they
23
had every reason to expect that the relationship would be the same.
Marshall pointed out that the articles of the Indian treaties that spoke
of protection must be construed in the context of other provisions of
the treaties and of the treaty-making process itself. Many of the other
treaty provisions recognized a right of self-government.
Claims by the state or by other grantees from the Crown to Indian
lands could not stand against the aboriginal right. These claims were
based on the colonial charters and of the practice of the Crown and
its successors to grant title -to lands yet remaining under aboriginal
possession. While the practice of granting these titles was recognized
in Fletcher and Johnson, no rights were created that could be set
against the Indian nations. Nor were such rights created by the language of protection in the treaties.
The actual state of things at the time, and all history since,
explain these charters; and the king of Great Britain, at the treaty
of peace, could cede only what belonged to his crown. These newly
asserted titles can derive no aid from the articles so often repeated
in Indian treaties; extending to -them, first, the protection of Great
Britain, and afterwards that of the United States. These articles are
associated with others, recognizing their title to self government. The
very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled
doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not sur120. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552.
121. Id. at 552-53.
122. Id. at 555-59.
123. "This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of
one more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and
submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." Id. at 555.
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render its independence-its right to self-government,
by associating
12 4
with a stronger, and taking its protection.
Relationships of dependence or protection, then, did not imply or
create any limitation on the national sovereignty or territorial integrity
of the Indian nations.
The Court also considered the status of treaties made with the
Indian nations:
The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a
people distinct from others." The constitution, by declaring treaties
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law
of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with
the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those
powers who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and
"'nation" are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic
and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and
well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we
have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied
to all in the same sense. 125
-The Indian treaties are therefore the law of the land. The laws of
Georgia that extended over the Indian country were in clear violation
of the territorial rights and rights to self-government guaranteed to
-the Cherokee Nation in -treaties with the United States.1 2 The Court
xuled on these grounds and others that 'the Georgia laws were "void,
as being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United
7
.States" and ordered Samuel Worcester released.1
The Court in Worcester went far beyond the question of land
xights. The decision recognized the Cherokee Nation as a distinct entity separate from both the State of Georgia and the United States, and
124. Id. at 560-61. Although the principles of the law of nations were studiously
avoided in the earlier Marshall Court cases, many of the concepts of Vattel arc in-

corporated into the Worcester decision. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW CoMMISSION, REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP
99-111 (1977). The unique importance of Worcester, however, lies in its analysis of
the customary international law of aboriginal rights in the North American experience.

125. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60.
126. The rights guaranteed to the Cherokee Nation in its treaties with the United
States were summarized by the Court. The treaties "mark out the boundary that separates
the Cherokee country from Georgia; guaranty toithem all the land. within their
boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens from
trespassing on it; and recognize the pre-existing power of the nation to govern itself."
Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 562-63. The decision was strongly grounded on the primacy of the
federal treaty with the Cherokee Nation. However, the Court also ruled that the Georgia
laws were in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act and the exclusive power of the United
States over Indian affairs vis-a-vis the states.
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possessed of the full rights and attributes of sovereignty. These rights
were neither qualified nor compromised by the rights of the British
Crown and its grantees, by treaties with the United States, by the laws
of any state, or by previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
While Worcester demonstrates the capacity of the common law to
recognize a complete spectrum of aboriginal rights, it also underscores
the vulnerability of aboriginal rights to the political process. The State
of Georgia refused to acknowledge the power of the Supreme Court
to annul its Indian laws.128 President Andrew Jackson, who favored
the policy of Indian removal, did nothing to enforce the ruling of the
Court. The dispute was only "resolved" with the forced expulsion of
the Cherokee from Georgia, known as the Trail of Tears, which resulted in the death of thousands of Cherokee people.
IV.

MITCHEL V. UNITED STATES'

29

In 1835, the Supreme Court considered the Indian title for the last
time in the Marshall years. The controversy concerned the recognition
of title to lands in Florida acquired from an Indian nation prior to the
purchase 'of Florida by the United States. For a period of twenty years,
Florida was a dominion of Great Britain. In its analysis of the rights
adhering to the land transaction, the Court used some interesting language in its description of -theBritish understanding of the Indian title.
Although the opinion of the Court did not expand or contract the
scope of aboriginal rights beyond those recognized in the Worcester
decision, it did provide added clarity to the concept of occupancy
rights:
One uniform rule seems to have prevailed, from [Britain's] first settlement, as appears by their laws; that friendly Indians were protected
in the possession of the lands they occupied, and were considered as
owning them, by a perpetual right of possession, in the tribe or nation
inhabiting them, as their common property, from generation to
generation . ..

.30

The Court went on to state:
Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference
to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much
128. 0. WARREN, supra note 85, at 768-69.
129. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
130. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
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in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites; and their
right to its exclusive enjoyment in their own way, and for their own
purposes, were as much respected, until they abandoned them, made
a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to individuals. 181
These two statements of the Court represent a definite recognition of
native rights to land based on aboriginal usage. Occupancy rights are
described to explicitly include communal tenures. Territorial rights
are acknowledged that involve "modes of life" and land usage that do
not conform to the tenures of the European cultures. While it may be
conceptually impossible to derive aboriginal usage from the feudal
structures underlying the common law of real property, Mitchel provides a clear example of how aboriginal tenures have been recognized
in Anglo-American legal systems, based on preexisting rights.
CONCLUSION

Over a period of twenty-five years, the Marshall Court evolved a
conceptual framework for the recognition -of aboriginal rights in the
American legal system. Beginning with an undefined recognition of
the "Indian title," the Court ultimately developed a complete recognition of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indian
nations. It is -important to read these cases as manifesting an evolving
doctrine. The concepts advanced in the early cases were tentative and
ambiguous, as the Court attempted to formulate a language that would
give legal coherence to the relationship between the European and
Indian societies.
The language of "discovery," "occupancy," "conquest," and "dominion" put forth in Johnson, and of dependency in Cherokee Nation,
when read in. the light of the Worcester decision, created no rights in
the United States other than the exclusive right to accept a voluntary
cession of Indian lands. Worcester stands for a repudiation of the
judicially created limitations of aboriginal rights that could be extracted from the ambiguities of the earlier cases. Aboriginal rights were
identified by the Court as originating in the pre-existing rights and
usage patterns of the Indian nations, and were recognized in, rather
than derived from the legal system.
For the most part, however, this legal history offers only one side
of the transaction. The cases represent an internal regulation of conduct of Indian affairs from the point of view of the United States. For
131. Id. at 746.
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a bilaterial view of aboriginal rights, it is necessary to look to the
treaties and the treaty-making process. It is there that the actual substance of aboriginal rights is to be found.
This need is underscored by the political context in which most
Indian cases occur. As previously noted, the judicial system is an aspect
of the national authority. It is less than surprising that the conquest
theory of Johnson was frequently cited by later courts as a decisive
precedent for the limitation of aboriginal rights. The court system and
the selection process of the common law have often been used as an
instrument of power in the relations between the United States and the
Indian nations. Thus while the Marshall Court cases provide a significant affirmation of aboriginal rights -in -theAmerican legal system, they
offer little hope for indigenous peoples attempting to achieve recognition of their rights in municipal legal systems. It is only in the international recognition of these principles, perhaps through a United
Nations Covenant on Aboriginal Rights, that some protection may be
offered.

